GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Abuse GitHub and SharePoint for Covert C2
Government agencies across Asia and Africa are being targeted by a newly uncovered intrusion campaign that deploys two previously undocumented backdoors, both of which turn legitimate cloud services into stealthy command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Kaspersky, which detected the activity in early 2026 and tracks it as Operation ShadowCloud, says the attackers are using Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub to blend malicious traffic with ordinary business activity.
Living off trusted platforms
The most notable aspect of the campaign is its reliance on what researchers often call "living off the land" services: instead of standing up dedicated C2 servers that defenders can block or sinkhole, the operators route instructions through platforms that most organizations already allow through their perimeter.
- GraphDoor communicates with Microsoft SharePoint, using it as a repository for tasking and exfiltration. Because SharePoint is a mainstream Microsoft 365 workload, traffic to it is rarely flagged as anomalous.
- GitDoor uses GitHub as its control channel, hiding commands inside repository activity. This makes malicious check-ins and fetches look like routine developer operations.
By piggybacking on services with trusted reputations and broad allowlisting, the backdoors make network-level detection substantially harder. Security teams that rely solely on domain reputation or static blocklists will see little to nothing out of the ordinary.
Targeting and discovery
Kaspersky reports that the campaign is aimed at government sectors in Asia and Africa. The Russian security vendor identified the activity in early 2026 and published its findings on the same day as the report. The naming of the operation — ShadowCloud — reflects the cloud-centric delivery and control mechanisms at the heart of the intrusion set.
The public summary does not disclose the initial access vector, the number of victims, or the specific countries affected. It also does not attribute the campaign to a known threat actor. Those gaps are significant: without knowing how the backdoors are first dropped, defenders cannot easily prioritize patching or hunting efforts.
Why cloud-service C2 is a growing problem
The technique is not new in principle, but it is becoming more common and more polished. Attackers have increasingly abused services such as GitHub, Dropbox, Slack, Telegram, and various Microsoft APIs to hide in plain sight. The advantages are clear:
- Allowlisted infrastructure: Many enterprises permit SharePoint and GitHub by default, so C2 traffic does not require a novel domain or IP address.
- Encrypted and legitimate-looking traffic: Activity blends into normal TLS sessions and API calls.
- Resilience: Taking down a GitHub repository or SharePoint site is slower and more complicated than blocking a single malicious IP.
- Attribution friction: The infrastructure belongs to reputable providers, complicating takedown and legal action.
For defenders, this shifts the burden from network blocking toward identity, endpoint, and behavioral monitoring. Detection must focus on how these services are used — unusual repository access patterns, anomalous SharePoint API calls, or non-standard user agents — rather than on whether the service itself is reachable.
Detection and mitigation guidance
While Kaspersky's public summary is light on technical indicators, organizations — particularly government-adjacent entities in Asia and Africa — can take several practical steps:
- Baseline cloud-service usage. Establish what normal GitHub and SharePoint traffic looks like for your environment, including which users and service accounts access them and when.
- Monitor for programmatic access anomalies. Look for automated or scripted interactions with SharePoint and GitHub that do not correspond to known developer or business workflows.
- Apply conditional access and least privilege. Restrict which identities can reach these services and from where, reducing the attack surface available to a backdoor.
- Inspect endpoint behavior. Because the C2 channel may look benign on the wire, endpoint detection for unusual process execution and persistence is critical.
- Hunt for the backdoors themselves. Security teams should search for artifacts associated with GitDoor and GraphDoor as more technical details become available.
What remains unknown
The Operation ShadowCloud report leaves several important questions open. The initial infection vector, the full list of targeted organizations, and any link to known APT groups have not been publicly detailed. As is often the case with early campaign disclosures, additional technical analysis — including indicators of compromise and malware samples — is likely to follow.
What is already clear is the direction of travel: attackers are increasingly treating trusted SaaS platforms as free, resilient, and hard-to-block C2 infrastructure. Defenders who treat cloud services as inherently safe do so at their own risk.
Conclusion
The GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoors are a reminder that the perimeter is no longer a network boundary but an identity and service boundary. Government agencies in Asia and Africa are the current focus, but the techniques involved are broadly applicable. Security teams should assume that any widely allowlisted cloud service can be repurposed for malicious control and adjust their monitoring accordingly.
Original source: The Hacker News — New GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Turn GitHub and SharePoint Into Covert C2 Channels